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I.

Introduction

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is an amendment to a federal statute
created to shield specific computers that would be vulnerable to attacks. Since its origin, the code
has grown and expanded far beyond its original scope. Courts are split on how the statute should
be interpreted when there are issues of impersonation on social media and terms of service
violations of websites. This report will discuss the legislative history and the intended use of the
statute. Followed by how the statute has grown since its inception, this report will further discuss
the future of the CFAA.
II.

The Birth and Growth of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is a heavily contested amendment to the
federal code 18 U.S.C. §10301. Courts across the country are split on how and when the section
should be applied. When the CFAA was passed in 1984 its application appeared
straightforward2. As time passed and the Internet grew, the CFAA has been stretched by courts
to cover many aspects of Internet governance, in some places, where it may not have been
intended to apply. Since the CFAA’s initial inception, the statute grew and in some courts has
become a catchall for all computer crimes.
At its earliest inception, the proposed amendment was very specific. The initial is found
in the “Health and Environment Miscellaneous” bill from the committee on Energy and
Commerce in 19833. The primary form of the statute was part of a medical reform bill, “Medical
Computer Crime Act of 1984,” to make unauthorized access to medical records “through a
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telecommunication device…” a crime4. Not only was this specified to medical records, it was
specific to unauthorized access or alteration of computerized medical records5
Congress held hearings to establish a computer crime statute in the early 1980’s. The
Judiciary Committee held hearings considering establishing criminal penalties for the Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud Act of 19836. The act expanded to protected computers
owned or used by the federal government, financial institutions, and/or businesses engaged in
interstate commerce7. The amendment originally stipulated to medical records now included
much more under its large umbrella.
As CFAA was being discussed in various hearings, the potential abuse of computers
became more evident. The act was expanded to include criminal penalties for computers
“involving unauthorized access to financial information, and unauthorized access to Government
information, including classified information related to foreign relations or national defense.”
The ever-growing amendment became a tool for national security and criminalized accessing
government information.8
By the time the bill’s senate floor debate was finished, it included: “unauthorized access
to or alteration of information in Federal interest computers.”9 Federal interest computers were
defined as “computers used by or for the Federal Government, those of federally insured
financial institutions, those of stockbrokers registered with the SEC, or those used in different
States…[i]ncludes provisions on illegal access to computerized individual medical record.”10
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Moreover, the act made it a crime to engage in the sale of passwords or similar
information that would allow unauthorized computer access.11 Congress intended the amendment
provide a well-defined assertion of prohibited activity to “the law enforcement community, those
who own and operate computers, as well as those who may be tempted to commit crimes by
unauthorized access.”12 Essentially, Congress intended those who would be affected by the law
to have clearly defined parameters as to what actions would constitute a crime or lead to civil
penalties.
To further ensure the act was correctly applied, the legislature changed “knowingly” to
“intentionally” in 1986, heightening the required mens rea.13The statute’s intent was to penalize
intentional unauthorized access and not careless ones.14 Although there was some concern that
the knowing standard was difficult to apply to technology.15 "’Intentional' means more than that
one voluntarily engaged in conduct or caused a result. Such conduct or the causing of the result
must have been the person's conscious objective."16 The user had to intend to go beyond his or
her authorization. More than just knowing he did, the user had to intend for that to be his
purpose.
Finally, the CFAA was officially codified in 1986, amending 18 USC §1030 of the US
Codes 17. The language includes: “intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without
authorization… alters, damages, or destroys information causes a loss…aggregating $1,000 or
more during any one year period…or modifies or impairs the medical examination, medical
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diagnosis, medical treatment, or medical care…”18 It included the unauthorized access of
medical records for a specific purpose.19
A “federal interest computer was defined as “exclusively for the use of a financial
institution or the United States Government, or…used by or for a financial institution or the
United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects the use of the
financial institution's operation or the Government's operation of such computer…”20 The act
includes two or more computers, used in committing the offense, that were not located in the
same state.21
After the act was codified, there were several changes to the definitions and the scope of
the statute. These changes were based on experience, technology, and world events. After 9/11,
Congress pushed through numerous national security reforms including cyber security and the
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT).22 The USA PATRIOT Act amended the definition of
“protected computer” to clarify the term includes computers outside of the United States so long
as they affect “interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.”23
Experience with the statute brought about expansions and revisions as computer crimes
escalated and the government began to work with the CFAA.24 Congress made revisions to the
amendment, which eliminated some requirements and expanded the act’s reach in 1988, 1989,
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1990, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, and 2008.25 The amendments eliminated 18 U.S.C.
§1030(a)(2)(C) which required information be stolen through interstate or foreign
communication and 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5) which required a loss of more than $5,000 and
created a felony when the damage affected 10 or more computers.26 Eliminating those
requirements increased the CFAA’s scope.
Further changes included expanding 18 USC §1030(a)(7) to criminalize threats to cause
computer damage and included threats to (1) steal data on a computer, (2) publicly disclose
stolen data, or (3) not repair damage already caused to the computer.27 The amendments
criminalized conspiracy to commit computer hacking, and again, broadened the definition of a
protected computer in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) to include those computers used in interstate or
foreign commerce or communication.28
The current CFAA applies to all “protected computers.” A protected computer is any
computer used in interstate commerce or communication and applies to Internet Service
Providers and individual computers.29 The CFAA creates seven crimes, including criminal
penalties, when a user “intentionally accesses” without authorized access or exceeding their
authorized access and attains information from a protected computer30. Furthermore, the statute
definition of “damage” is a vague term that can mean anything that impairs the data of a
program, system, or information.31
CFAA set forth criminal penalties and criminalized unauthorized access to a computer
“knowingly with intent to defraud” and retrieving any information that may be valuable, unless
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the object of the fraud consists only of the use of the computer and is less than $5,000 in a one
year period.32 Punishment for such crimes can be as minimal as fines ranging to a maximum of
twenty years imprisonment depending on what part of the statute is violated.33
The statute also provides civil liabilities, “Any person who suffers damage or loss by
reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”34 If the section is violated,
“A civil action for a violation… may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set
forth in subclauses… subsection (c)(4)(A)(i).”35 The statute limits damages to economic
damages and sets the statute of limitations within two years of the date of the alleged act or
discovery of the damage.36
III.

Interpretations that Expand the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

Courts across the nation have used the CFAA to prosecute and hold defendants civilly
liable for damages when a person exceeds the authority of accessing an email account, or
utilizing someone else’s social media profile as their own. These courts have various reasons that
impersonating someone on social media sites and through their e-mail violates the CFAA.
The District Court of Massachusetts held that accessing another’s social media account,
without his permission, created liability under the CFAA in Mahoney v. Denuzzio, 2014 U.S.
Dist. (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2014).37 In Mahoney, James Mahoney and Danielle Denuzzio were once
romantically involved and had a child together. Their relationship disintegrated and tensions
rose regarding child custody.38 Mahoney had visited Denuzzio’s home and accessed his own
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personal Yahoo! e-mail and Facebook accounts using her computer.39 DeNuzzio had disclosed
two pages of racist emails to the Probate Court that were from Mahoney’s Yahoo! Account.”40
DeNuzzio had intended to use the emails to show Mahoney was a racist and therefore, it would
not have been in the child’s best interest to be in his custody.41
Mahoney alleged that DeNuzzio composed the emails and the court order was the first
notice he received that she obtained access to his accounts. He contends that he did not give her
passwords to either his email or Facebook account.42 Mahoney hired a computer forensics expert
that concluded “on 502 occasions from January 1 through June 27, 2011, someone using the
computer DeNuzzio regularly used had obtained access to Mahoney's Yahoo! e-mail account.”43
Mahoney suspected that Denuzzio obtained his password by using software that recorded his
keystrokes and sought to file a criminal complaint but criminal charges were never pursued.44
The civil court found that the complaint plausibly stated grounds for relief.45 The
computer was involved in interstate commerce, and according to the court, all computers
connected to the Internet are considered “protected.”46 DeNuzzio did not have the authority to
access Mahoney’s e-mail or social media accounts.47 The plaintiff’s monetary loss was
reasonable in response to “…an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring . . . the
system . . . to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.”48 Mahoney’s costs include
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hiring a computer forensics firm and hiring an attorney to remedy the breach in the probate
court.49
The court held that the motion could survive a motion to dismiss, but no further action
was taken at the time of this report. Consequently, the facts of the case fall directly under
CFAA’s civil liabilities allowed.50 Mahoney’s monetary damages were directly related to
DeNuzzio’s unauthorized use of his e-mail account because the damages included investigation
and attorney’s fees for his lawsuit.51
Sewell v. Bernardin, 795 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2015) is a case of first impression from the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The lower court dismissed the complaint as being time
barred by the two-year statute of limitations.52 Sewell and Bernardin were in a romantic
relationship until 2011.53 Throughout their relationship, Sewell maintained a private e-mail and
Facebook account.54 Bernardin did not have the passwords or access to these accounts.55
In August 2011, Sewell was notified that her AOL password had been changed and the
unauthorized user sent out malicious emails, regarding her sexual activities, to her family
members.56 In February of 2012, Sewell was unable to log into her Facebook account and on
March 1, 2012 someone posted a public message containing malicious statements about
Sewell.57
On August 2, 2014, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
granted Bernardin's motion to dismiss, holding that “Sewell's claims were time-barred under the
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CFAA's and SCA's applicable two-year statutes of limitations.”58 Sewell then appealed and on
appeal the lower court’s decision to dismiss was affirmed.59 The AOL account breach was time
barred by the statute.60
On appeal, the circuit court concluded that there were two separate CFAA claims: 1)
from the AOL account when she had notice in August 2011 and from the defendant accessing
her Facebook account in February of 2012.61 The court held that the CFAA claim “is premised
on impairment to the integrity of a computer owned and operated by AOL, not of her own
physical computer.”62 CFAA claims are for the programs that were utilized by the user and
trespasser and not just the trespass of the physical computer, itself.63The court held that there
were two valid claims under the CFAA and that one, regarding unauthorized use of her Facebook
account, was not time barred under the statute.64 There were no further court proceedings at the
time. Here, the court sought to clarify the a CFAA claim does not focus on the victim’s personal
computer but of the computers of the programs that are accessed.
The most recent case litigated under CFAA is Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.,
2016 U.S. App. 12781 (9th Cir.). Power Ventures, the defendant, created a social networking
website that operated by aggregating a user’s previously existing social networking accounts and
information.65 The “Power user” could see all their contacts from multiple social networking
sites through a single program and could click through the central Power website to individual
social networking sites.66
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At the time of Power’s promotional campaign, Facebook.com, the plaintiff, had 130
million users and allowed limited access to non-members.67 Third party software developers, or
websites that want to contact Facebook users through its website, must enroll in “Facebook
Connect,” a program that requires a user to agree to an additional Developer Terms of Use
Agreement.68
In December 2008, Power began a promotional campaign where they placed an icon on
their website to entice users to share Power.com by stating, “First 100 people who bring 100 new
friends to Power.com win $100.”69 Once a user clicked “Yes, I do!” Power would create an
event, photo, or status on the Facebook user’s profile.70 Depending on a Facebook user’s
settings, Power would send a message or e-mail to the user’s friends within Facebook’s system.71
For example, if a Power user shared the promotion through an event, Facebook generated
e-mail to an external e-mail account from the user to their friends.72 The e-mail provided the
name and time of the event, listing Power as the host, and said the Power user was inviting them
to the event.73 “The external e-mails were form e-mails, generated each time that a Facebook
user invited others to an event. The ‘from’ line in the e-mail stated that the message came from
Facebook; the body was signed, ‘The Facebook Team.’”74
Facebook was unaware of Power’s promotional campaign until December 2008, and
when they did they sent a “cease and desist” letter to Power.75 Facebook attempted to have
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Power register in Facebook Connect and sign the special Developer Terms of Use Agreement. 76
When they refused Facebook established an Internet Protocol (“IP”) block to prevent them from
accessing Facebook’s website.77 Power switched IP addresses to avoid the block and continued
its promotion even though it utilized Facebook.com without Facebook’s permission.78 In total,
over the course of Power’s campaign, they sent more than 60,000 external emails using
Facebook’s system, and countless internal messages.79 By April 2011, Power had gone out of
business.80
Facebook argued violations under the CFAA, which prohibits acts of computer trespass
by those unauthorized users or users who exceed their authorization.81 The court held that
Facebook suffered a loss and was entitled to civil penalties because Facebook employees “spent
many hours, totaling more than $5,000 in costs, analyzing, investigating, and responding to
Power's actions”82.
The court concluded that Power accessed Facebook’s computers knowing they did not
have authorization.83 The court based its analysis on two previous cases: United States v. Nosal,
676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) also known as “Nosal I” and United States v. Nosal, No. 14-10037,
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12382, (9th Cir. July 5,2016) known as "Nosal II".84 There are two
general rules the court needs to follow using Nosal’s analysis: first, a defendant can violate the
CFAA when he lacks permission to access a computer or when his permission has been
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explicitly revoked.85 Using better technology or a third party to help access a site does not excuse
the violating user of liability.86 Second, violating the terms of use for a website, alone, cannot be
a basis for liability.87
IV.

Interpretations that Narrow the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

In some courts, the interpretation has been broadened beyond what the original intent
may have been. On the other hand, there are a number of courts that construe the terms narrowly.
In doing so, the vague statute is being tapered to apply in a smaller number of circumstances.
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) is a well-known case involving
the CFAA. The issue in the case was whether a violation of the “Terms of Service” (“TOS”) for
a website constitutes a crime under the CFAA.88 Drew, a resident of Missouri, entered a
conspiracy to intentionally access a computer used in interstate commerce, without authorization,
in order to commit a tortious act (infliction of emotional distress) on Megan Meier, a thirteen
year old girl.89 Drew, and conspirators, impersonated 16-year-old boy named “Josh” they began
a romantic relationship via MySpace until the conspirators told Megan he did not like her and
“the world would be a better place without her in it.”90 Megan killed herself later that day.
Their actions violated the MySpace Terms of Service (“TOS”)91 Drew was indicted for
one count of conspiracy and three counts of violating the felony portion of the CFAA “which
prohibit accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization and obtaining
information from a protected computer where the conduct involves an interstate or foreign
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communication and the offense is committed in furtherance of a crime or tortious act.”92
The court went through an analysis of the Myspace TOS. In 2006, to be a Myspace
member, a person had to access the sign up section for the Myspace website and register by
filling out information meeting specific age requirements.93 The information required included:
name, e-mail, and date of birth, country, zip, code, and gender.94 The registrant had to click the
“I agree” box for Myspace’s TOS and Privacy Policy.95 The Terms of Service did not appear on
the same page, and to read them the user had to scroll to the bottom to click on the “Terms”
hyperlink.96 Unsurprisingly, a person could easily become a member of the Myspace community
without ever reading the TOS section.97
The TOS prohibited posting content that could be offensive and “promotes…harasses or
advocates harassment of another person…promotes illegal activity… or promotes illegal
activities or conduct that is abusive, threatening…includes a photograph of another
person…without their consent…”98 The Myspace TOS reserved the right to take legal action
against anyone who engaged in the prohibited activity which included “a) ‘criminal or tortious
activity’, b) ‘attempting to impersonate another Member or person’, c) ‘using any information
obtained from the Services in order to harass, abuse, or harm another person’, d) ‘using the
Service in a manner inconsistent with any and all applicable laws and regulations’… “99
The TOS warned other users that other Myspace members may have false or misleading
information on their profiles, and further indicated that Myspace will not be held liable.100
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Moreover, Myspace reserved the right to change their TOS at any time, which meant a member
would have to check the TOS every time they logged on to ensure they were not violating the
terms.101
The relevant issue was whether a computer user’s intentional violation of a websites
terms of services satisfies the first element of U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C): defendant intentionally
accessed without authorization of a computer.102 If the answer was yes, then any conscious
violation will constitute a CFAA misdemeanor.103 The following elements are always met when
a person utilizing a computer contacts or communicates with a website.104 Accessing
information can be as minimal as observation of the data.105 Targeting the data for collection or
corruption is not needed to prove a violation.106
The district court analyzed the first element, intentionally accessed without authorization
of a computer, focusing on three undefined terms.107 “Intentionally’ is undefined, the court uses
the legislative history of the CFAA. The court interpreted Congress’s actions of raising the
scienter from knowing to intent to show a heightened mens rea.108 The legislator intended for a
defendant to mean to cross an unauthorized threshold and not just know they crossed it. The
court uses the dictionary definition of “access” “to gain or have access to; to retrieve…”109 The
third undefined and necessary term, “without authorization” is a term that will change depending
on the nature of the circumstances, according to the court.110
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Applying this to the facts of the case, the only factual basis to conclude Drew
intentionally accessed Myspace’s servers without authorization was her violating Myspace’s
TOS by deliberately creating the fake “Josh Evans” profile using a photo of a juvenile without
permission just to communicate with Meagan.111 The court concludes that an intentional breach
of the MSTOS can potentially constitute accessing the Myspace server without authorization
under the statute.112
The owner of a website has the right to institute the boundaries of information their
members can access or applications available on their website.113 As a right of law, an owner can
relay and impose “limitations/restrictions/conditions” by a written notice like the terms of service
or use provisions on a homepage.114 Most courts that have reviewed TOS cases have held that a
website’s TOS can define what is authorized regarding a website.115
The court concluded that basing a CFAA misdemeanor upon the violation of a websites
TOS would contravene the void-for-vagueness doctrine.116 When it comes to “clickwrap”
agreements, like the Myspace TOS, the issue is whether a person of “common intelligence”
would be on notice that a breach of the terms would create a CFAA violation.117 First, the statute
itself does not put people on notice, they may be aware of civil penalties but not criminal
charges.118
Second, the TOS does not specify which breached term leads to termination of authorized
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access for the user.119 The court concluded that “if any violation of any term of service is held to
make the access unauthorized, that strategy would probably resolve this particular vagueness
issue; but …render the statute incredibly overbroad and contravene the second prong of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine as to setting guidelines to govern law enforcement.”120
Third, by utilizing the TOS as the basis for a crime, it makes the website owner the party
who defines criminal conduct.121 It is possible that the description in the TOS is so vague that a
reasonable person might be unsure of what the TOS covers.122Fourth, because the TOS are a
contractual way to set the scope of authorized access “a level of indefiniteness arises from the
necessary application of contract law in general and/or other contractual requirements within the
applicable terms of service to any criminal prosecution.”123
The court concluded that treating a website’s TOS violation as an 18 U.S.C.
§1030(a)(2)(C), would turn the section “into an overwhelmingly overbroad enactment that would
convert a multitude of otherwise innocent Internet users into misdemeanant criminals.”124
Concluding any other way would create a law that "that affords too much discretion to the police
and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet]."125
Tan v. Doe, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61972 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014), narrowed the
definition of a “protected computer” and what it means to “damage” a computer. This case was
litigated under the CFAA private right of action.126 Tan involved two business partners whose
partnership ended antagonistically.127 The plaintiffs were a married couple, Miah, co-founded a
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digital music company called UrFilez.128 There was a dispute between Miah and the co-founder
and in August 2012, the plaintiffs claim that derogatory posts appeared on several blogs,
including their wedding photo.129 The posts accused the couple of fraudulent and unethical
misconduct, which included siphoning money from UrFilez.130
The plaintiffs allege that the blogs have spread to social media sites and have resulted in
irreparable damage to their personal and professional reputations.131 Their complaint against
“John Doe” included an application to subpoena non-party websites including Twitter and
Facebook to help them identify who “John Doe” was and a temporary restraining order
“directing these companies to remove the derogatory statements from their website.”132
The plaintiffs’ complaint asserts copyright infringement, defamation, tortious
interference, false light, and a violation of the CFAA.133 The court analyzed the plaintiff’s CFAA
claim, and found they failed to state a claim for three reasons:134 The court found the complaint
failed to allege a “protected computer let alone a “computer” that was accessed or damaged as a
result of alleged conduct.135
CFAA defines a protected computer to include a "computer…used in interstate or foreign
commerce or communication."136 To satisfy this, the court held the facts must evince a plausible
inference of a substantial use of the computer related to interstate commerce.137 The fact a
computer is connected to the Internet and able to be used in interstate commerce is not enough to
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be considered actually used in interstate commerce.138
Consequently, if the court assumed that the defendant’s utilizing Facebook to retrieve
their wedding photo was unauthorized access of a protected computer, their CFAA clam still
fails.139 The CFAA claim does not allege the access resulted in any damage to the computer.140
Downloading and circulating the wedding photo, even if it were confidential information, does
no destruction or impairment to the “underlying data.”141 Plaintiffs did not allege their photo was
destroyed or impaired.142
The Tan Court’s analysis is completely different than the court in Drew which held the
elements are always met when a person communicates with a website and even observing the
data is enough to prove a violation.143 The court based the interpretation in senate reports.144
Finally, the plaintiff’s financial damages are not the types that were considered under the
CFAA.145 They allege that the aggregate losses resulting from the defendant’s conduct was more
than $10,000, the damages are not discernable under the statute.146 CFAA “’loss …is limited to
the ‘cost of investigating or remedying damage to a computer, or cost incurred because the
computer's service was interrupted…”147 The loss plaintiffs alleged pertained to their business
reputation which is not what the CFAA designates as a loss.
However, in 2015, another CFAA interpretation came to light which further narrowed its
scope. Bittman v. Fox, 107 F. Supp. 3d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2015) interprets the CFAA to exclude
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cases of social media impersonation, even if there were financial damages.148 Plaintiff Bridget
Bittman is a marketing and public relations employee at the Orland Park Public Library. 149 In the
fall of 2013, Fox and DuJan complained that the library was providing unfiltered access to the
Internet and lobbied the library to change their policies.150 Bittman, in charge of public relations,
responded to the defendant’s complaints.151
Subsequently, Bittman, Fox, and DuJan began a special media war with Fox and DuJan
making defamatory statements about Bittman.152 Fox posted comments about Bittman on her
Facebook page, accusing Bittman and the public library of presenting a “hatefest” and making
false police complaints against Fox and DuJan.153
Fox posted a photo of Bittman holding a champagne bottle and accused her of “being
drunk to claim the ridiculous things she does about the library in the media…”154 Fox then
posted photos of Bittman’s home on the Internet, which Bittman alleged was an attempt to harass
her.155 Fox published a video titled “Bridget Bittman commits Disorderly Conduct/Breach of
Peace on 7/8/14 according to Officer Schmidt" and several captions of defamatory statements. 156
Furthermore, Fox and DuJan created a Facebook page, “Sassy Plants Illinois”
impersonating Bittman and her floral business.157 They utilized her personal photos and photos
of her floral arrangements without her authorization and posted statements to convince people
that Bittman, in reality, controlled the page.158 The statements included derogatory references

148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Bittman v. Fox, 107 F. Supp. 3d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
Id at 898.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

20

imply that Bittman was prejudiced.159 Finally, in January 2015, Bittman filed a thirteen-count
complaint including one count under the CFAA.160
The CFAA prohibits unauthorized users from intentionally accessing secure computers
and damaging the computer or data.161 Bittman argues Fox and DuJan are liable for creating the
Sassy Plants Facebook Page, violating Facebook’s terms of use.162 By creating the page, using
photographs of herself and her floral arrangements, Fox and DuJan violated the terms of use and
exceeded their authorized access to Facebook’s computers.163
The court concluded that Bittman presented no evidence which suggested the CFAA
provided a cause of action for the alleged transgression.164 The court held, “the statutory purpose
of the CFAA is to punish trespassers and hackers.”165 They looked to the legislative history of
the act, and surmised that Congress was concerned with hackers attacking using viruses and
possibly disgruntled computer programmers.166 CFAA was not enacted to punish people who
create fake social media accounts, violating the website’s terms of service.167
The court hypothesizes that even if Fox and DuJan violated Facebook’s terms of use by
creating the fake account to impersonate and defame Bittman, the action does not constitute
“exceeding authorization” as envisioned in CFAA.168 Fox and DuJan did not damage, steal, or
tamper with Bittman’s data.169 They had no intention in permanently harming Bittman’s
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computer data.170

V. The Future of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Differing interpretations of the CFAA have caused disconnect in the courts regarding
how and when the CFAA applies to cases involving social media websites and email accounts.
Some courts interpret “protected” as any computer utilized in interstate commerce.171 While
others use a stricter definition, requiring the computer be used in interstate commerce, being
connected to the Internet is not enough to require federal protection.172 Unauthorized access of
information can be simply accessing information without authorization with no actual objective
necessary for a violation.173
The conflicts have become so contentious that the Department of Justice recently
published a memo, dated September 11, 2014 on their website in October of 2016.174 The memo,
written by Eric Holder as the Attorney General, stated that the memo was to provide guidance
for prosecutors.175 The memo provided prosecutors with eight factors. The first, and major
factor, was to consider whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest.176 Though
ambiguous, the factor would help separate serious hackers and threats to cybersecurity from
computer users who violate a website’s terms of service.
Some other factors include: 1) sensitivity of the affected computer system or the
information transmitted by or stored on it; 2) the national security implications of the crime
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impact of the crime on victims; 3) the deterrent value of the investigation; 4) whether the crime
can be prosecuted by another jurisdiction if it is declined for federal prosecution; 5)if information
is obtained by exceeding authorized access.177
Only a minority of states enacted legislation regarding identity theft on social media sites,
allowing them to prosecute the crime avoiding utilization of the CFAA.178 Texas is an example
of a state law regarding online impersonation: “a person commits an offense if the person,
without obtaining the other person's consent and with the intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or
threaten any person, uses the name or persona of another person to:(1) create a web page on a
commercial social networking site or other Internet website…”179
Due to the ambiguous language and tough punishments for violations there has been an
outcry for change. An article in Scientific American exemplified a harsh fact: “CFAA allows
prosecutors to pursue the same draconian measures—punishments ranging from five to 15 years
per charge—for acts as benign as violating the terms of a vendor’s service agreements and those
as malicious as a concerted effort to break into a computer and steal credit card numbers.”180
Congress has considered amending the CFAA to clarify “access without
authorization.”181 “Aaron’s Law Act of 2015” is an attempt by lawmakers to reform the CFAA
which is an “overly broad law currently allows breathtaking levels of prosecutorial
discretion…”182 The main objective of Aaron’s Law’s is to retain the parts of the CFAA that
work while eliminating the portions prone to abuse.183
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One of the proposed changes includes replacing the term “exceeds authorized access”
with “access without authorization means (A) to obtain information on a protected computer; (B)
that the accesser lacks authorization to obtain; and (C) by knowingly circumventing one or more
technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized
individuals from obtaining that information;’’184 Such a change would create a more concrete
definition for a critical term used in the statute.
Furthermore, the proposed amendment would make criminal penalties proportional to the
crime committed under the act.185” By striking ‘conviction for another’' and inserting
‘subsequent’; and (B) by inserting ‘such’ after ‘attempt to commit’’; by inserting after ‘financial
gain’ the following: ‘and the fair market value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000…’”186
The offense would be committed “…furtherance of any criminal act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State punishable by a term of imprisonment
greater than one year, unless such criminal acts are prohibited by this section or such State
violation would be based solely on accessing information without authorization…''187
The proposed changes would tailor the CFAA back to its original legislative intent: an
anti-hacking law. There would be less room for courts to apply the law in cases of social media
impersonation and other situations where it did not belong. An amendment would protect the
CFAA from abuse and overreach. State legislatures have the power to create such laws and only
a minority of state legislated such statutes. The alteration of the sentencing section would
enhance the sentencing portion by eliminating the problem of minor offenses being punishable
the same as more severe violations.
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On the other hand, there is an argument for more power under the statute.188 Some
lawmakers believe that in the age of cyber-attacks and technological warfare, the CFAA should
be much stronger. In 2011, President Obama issued the Cyber Security Legislative Proposal
urging Congress to give the government, and the private sector, more powerful tools and harsher
punishments.189 Part of the plan includes an increase in penalties and expansion of the
government’s power for enforcement of the CFAA.190 Instead of the minimum penalty being
merely a misdemeanor, the least offensive violation would still be considered a felony, with a
ten-year maximum.191 At a Congressional hearing witnesses, including FBI agents, stated
hacktivists were among their adversaries.192 Their reforms would give the government more
power but go after serious threats to national security.
To better prosecute these crimes law enforcement would require the appropriate tools to
investigate and prosecute cybercrimes. It also reaffirms important components of 2011 proposals
to update the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, applying it to
cybercrimes. 193Finally, the proposal modernizes the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by ensuring
that insignificant conduct does not fall within the scope of the statute, while making clear that it
can be used to prosecute insiders who abuse their ability to access information to use it for their
own purposes.
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Moreover, “exceeds authorized access” includes “… when he accesses information ‘for a
purpose that the accesser knows is not authorized by the computer owner.’”194 In some cases, the
language would prohibit breaching a written condition, like a Terms of Service written by a
website.195 The addition would create havoc in the courts as to what the computer owner would
and would not allow when it is not a written condition. It gives prosecutors across the country a
large amount of discretion as to what the unauthorized user was on notice about as to what they
had the authority to access.
The proposed legislation would add a provision that would punish a user who
“intentionally exceeds authorized access to a protected computer, and thereby obtains
information from such computer” if one of three conditions are met: “(i) the value of the
information obtained exceeds $5,000; (ii) the offense was committed in furtherance of any felony
… or (iii) the protected computer is owned or operated by or on behalf of a governmental
entity.”196 Also, instead of requiring the government to prove “intent to defraud” prosecutors
would have to establish “willfulness,” criminalizing unlawful trafficking of access to “other
types of wrongdoing perpetrated using botnets” and not just password and similar information.197
VI. Conclusion
It is clear the CFAA needs to be amended. The amount of ambiguity and discretion has
allowed to a vast array of applications often, far beyond the original legislative intent. The
Internet has grown a great deal since the CFAA was established and in turn requires more
specific federal legislation. Many agree that the CFAA needs modification. However, they
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cannot decide on if the government should have more control or less control. The CFAA needs
to be broadened in some areas and restricted in others.
The future of the CFAA should include serious punishments that fit the violation
committed. Cyber-attacks are a dangerous threat to national security and should be treated as
such. The sentences should be a grave deterrent for potential hackers. However, a user utilizing
someone else’s Twitter account should not be as punishable as a more serious violation, like a
cyber-attack on a government computer. The sentencing requirements must be clearly stated to
ensure judges know what to apply during sentencing.
Unambiguous definitions are necessary for the CFAA to become a useful statute going
forward. Two terms that need to be dealt with are: “exceeding authorized access” and “without
authorization.” These terms must be neatly tailored to a select group or done away with
completely. Currently, there are a large amount of internet users that fall into this very broad
category. Change is necessary and it needs to be done quickly.
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